"If we attempted
to paint an "impressionistic" rendering of your experience, the
jangling riot of colour blobs would not capture the content; you do not have
the experience of a jangling riot of colour blobs, any more than you have the
experience of an ellipse when you look at a penny obliquely." -Daniel Dennett
In a much
loved episode of the Irish comedy series “Father Ted” there is a fabulous
sketch where the infinitely hapless two main characters (Father Ted and Father
Dougal) are holidaying in a caravan attempting to amuse themselves in the
middle of a field of cattle. At one point Father Ted decides to explain the theory
perspective to Father Dougal with the help of some plastic toy cows.
Father Ted: “Now one last time. These…” [he lifts two plastic cows from the table] “…are small; but the ones out there…” [looking out to some cows beyond the window] “…are far away.”
[Father Dougal shakes his head in bewilderment]
Father Ted: [motioning again with the model cows] “Small.”
Father Ted: [Frowning intently out of the window] “Far away.”
The
humour derives from our recognition that given a very warped perception it
might just be conceivable that someone of Dougal’s naïve outlook could possibly
think that things actually shrink as they recede into the distance. Not even
children make this elementary perceptual mistake and why should they, what
possible evolutionary advantage could it confer upon them or us, or any other
species for that matter?
Notice
though that Father Ted makes no reference at any time to the distant cows
“appearing” to be small. He gets it exactly right: distant cows are not small
and the only reason we would think of them as small would be if we were
considering them in the terms of two
dimensional representations. The problem is exactly the same as the one that
raised such copious commentary in my previous post about tilted disks having
the ‘appearance’ of ellipses.
If
philosophers and cognitive scientists such as Alva Noë and Daniel
Dennett are to be believed, this issue bedevils the form of philosophy known as
phenomenology (from Greek: phainómenon,
literally the
“study” of “that which appears”):
“It’s hard to
see how phenomenology could be anything more than earnest pleading as to the
supposed revelations of one’s own inner searchings. One phenomenologist says:
‘when I look at a circular coin tilted away I see something elliptical.’
Another phenomenologist demures: ‘circular coins seen tilted don’t look
elliptical; rather, they look like circular coins.’ Such a dispute, if it even
rises to the level of genuine dispute, does not – indeed, cannot – engage with
matters beyond its basic terms; it floats free of questions about the natural
world. Phenomenology, conceived this way, makes no meaningful epistemic
commitments.” –Alva
Noë, “A Critique of Pure Phenomenology”
Alva
Noë fairs a little better in his examination of these kinds of
perceptual issues, but what he fails to grasp is the purposefulness of
perception: seeing ellipses where there are tilted disks has only one known
exploitable function or purpose; to enable the production and consumption of what
Donald Brook calls "simulating representations" of tilted circular
objects (ie: representations that we, as a species, have characteristic difficulty
discriminating from the things they represent under certain circumstances and in certain respects). In Noë's understandable eagerness to distance himself from previous assertions that we perceive the world as a multitude of representations, he makes the
mistake of paying insufficient attention to the role of representation in perception.
Like Noë, Walter Hopp of Boston University has some thoughts and observations to add to the debate. Hopp suggests that Noë would be
better off jettisoning his claim that we simultaneously perceive tilted disks
as both round and elliptical. Hopp may well be correct to make this suggestion but, if he is, we are once
again left with an incomplete explanation of why people can be so
adamant (artists and representation makers in particular) that they see ellipses where there are clearly tilted circular objects or why a
toy cow might ‘appear’ the same size as a real cow situated at a distance.
Perhaps a couple of examples might help to clarify
where Noë and Hopp have missed an important point (and where Brook's work sheds some important light). In the following animation the size of a representation of a balloon is
enlarged. I’m sure you will predict the outcome, but have a look anyway just to
confirm what you already know.
Everybody I have shown this to
says the same thing: “It looks like the balloon is inflating.” Now have a look
at the next animation of a car.
What did you perceive? Was it the same as the balloon? Did it appear to inflate or did something else happen? Everyone I have shown this to tells me that they have the impression of an oncoming car. What might seem a little strange though is that exactly the same thing happens in both animations: the image has simply been enlarged over time. But whilst the balloon appears to get bigger, the car appears to move forwards. What we know of the objects depicted is clearly influencing our perception at a fundamental level.
If we didn’t instinctively recognise the characteristic
signs of looming vehicles, oncoming fists, or approaching projectiles our
chances of survival would be severely limited. Perspectival distortions, as
Father Ted knew all to well, provide us with crucially important information
about our environment that no other perceptual abilities can achieve so effortlessly.
To speak of appearances – to think of them - is to think of
how we could simulate the things seen via the sophisticated strategies of
representation. Avoiding oncoming cars and other large or fast moving bodies is
often a far more pressing issue.