tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post2732797246838060931..comments2023-08-19T10:04:08.922+01:00Comments on Thought • Art • Representation: Language In A Petri Dish: the scientific misunderstanding of signalsJim Hamlynhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comBlogger277125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-9086533292643679852015-06-01T23:45:30.074+01:002015-06-01T23:45:30.074+01:00How can we decide whether a person has performed w...How can we decide whether a person has performed what we might characterise correctly as the action (for example) of hailing a taxi, when she s/he has demonstrably performed the incontestable bodily behaviour of raising a hand in the street?<br /><br />The answer has two parts:<br /><br />A. The objectively assessable street situation must be one in which there is traffic visible in the street, some item of which seems to qualify passably as a taxi,<br /><br />and (because this is not enough)<br /><br />B. The person must be demonstrably disposed to respond appropriately to some such question as (in verbal form) "What are you doing?" by saying "I'm hailing a taxi."<br /><br />If the street is empty we must say that, whether or not it is identifiable with some other action, this person's behaviour is not identifiable with the action of hailing a taxi (although it could be identifiable with the action of showing us how to hail a taxi).<br /><br />If the person actually says 'I'm greeting my friend over there' we must also say that (unless s/he's lying) that this person's behaviour is not identifiable with the action of hailing a taxi.<br /><br />The way to determine whether a behaviour is intentional is not by scanning the brain but by triggering the display of the associated representational capacity. We can do this with one another very easily but we haven't even begun to explore how we could trigger such displays on the part of nonverbals or to ask what would qualify as a viable representation that other members of the relevant species would accept. Maybe scientists will stumble on this unexplored possibility by accident one day and a whole new chapter of investigation will emerge.Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-86911632988081770882015-06-01T23:44:52.218+01:002015-06-01T23:44:52.218+01:00Ok I give up. Could someone please tell me what &q...Ok I give up. Could someone please tell me what "linguaformalism" means?John Rhttp://www.afriendinfacebook.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-86824599140035035642015-06-01T23:43:40.908+01:002015-06-01T23:43:40.908+01:00I think Jim Hamlyn was simply trying to say that a...I think Jim Hamlyn was simply trying to say that actions sometimes count as real efficient causes. For example, in a Court of Law, we are not concerned with the neural wiring of the Defendant. We are concerned with whether or not the actions of the Defendant were compelled or if they were of his own free choice. We certainly, take this distinction to be real. Otherwise, the choice between guilt or innocence is illusory.John Shttp://www.realistantiintellectualist.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-8896167923171519522015-06-01T22:48:05.045+01:002015-06-01T22:48:05.045+01:00"the common math circuitry is there."
Ag..."the common math circuitry is there."<br />Again, primitive conceptual continuity with animals is no argument against linguaformalism in mathematics. Heck, I think vigorous criticism of the Cartesian idea of animals as automata is pretty much a moral requirement. The macroscopic structure we share with higher animals is not discontinuous; It's shared and similarly predicative. Language abstracts that austere predicative structure (it doesn't impose it; our shared evolutionary heritage does), and then other interesting things happen. It's perhaps worth noting btw that, unlike most of mathematics, counting doesn't require quantification.Joehttp://www.joemahoney.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-21012045640314315352015-06-01T22:46:27.518+01:002015-06-01T22:46:27.518+01:00The trouble with Jim's Sellars' quote is i...The trouble with Jim's Sellars' quote is it is an extended answer to a 'what is' question, a problem of word meanings. I have been guilty of this sort of low fruit picking myself, but rather than finding causal explanations it turns a problem into a word puzzle.Brucehttp://www.brucecaithness.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-42897445968381784832015-06-01T20:56:01.921+01:002015-06-01T20:56:01.921+01:00I was thinking exactly this just a couple days ago...I was thinking exactly this just a couple days ago:<br />Jim wrote: "The Scientific Image is a human construct after all for the consumption and use of human beings and as such it is an inextricable part of the Manifest Image no matter how objective it turns out to be."John Rhttp://www.afriendinfacebook.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-35227934593183253052015-06-01T20:54:36.547+01:002015-06-01T20:54:36.547+01:00I was thinking exactly this just a couple days ago...I was thinking exactly this just a couple days ago:<br />Jim wrote: <>John Rhttp://www.afriendonfacebook.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-43304312594589753812015-06-01T20:53:44.935+01:002015-06-01T20:53:44.935+01:00I told you Jim Hamlyn writes beautifully. Sometim...I told you Jim Hamlyn writes beautifully. Sometimes, I feel convinced that I agree with him just for the sheer beauty of the writing alone!John Rhttp://www.afriendonfacebook.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-23729743057796821912015-06-01T20:52:03.474+01:002015-06-01T20:52:03.474+01:00Well Matt, I think your repeated reference to Sell...Well Matt, I think your repeated reference to Sellars distinction between the Manifest and Scientific Images may well turn out to be your undoing. Reading his short essay again I find that he was aware of the very danger I have been trying to draw attention to all along:<br /><br />"The first point I want to make is that only a being capable of deliberation can properly be said to act, either impulsively of from habit. For in the full and non-metaphorical sense an action is the sort of thing that can be done deliberately. We speak of actions as becoming habitual, and this is no accident. It is important to realize that the term 'habit' in speaking of an earthworm as acquiring the habit of turning to the right in a T-maze, is a metaphorical extension of the term. There is nothing dangerous in the metaphor until the mistake is made of assuming that the habits of persons are the same sort of thing as the (metaphorical) 'habits' of earthworms and white rats."Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-49994924247831267172015-06-01T20:51:35.254+01:002015-06-01T20:51:35.254+01:00So Matt, for you intention is "about degree o...So Matt, for you intention is "about degree of regional activation..."<br /><br />So the higher the degree of regional activation, the more someone intends their associated action. And where there is lots and lots of regional activation then the owner of the activation — at least on your account — must really really mean what they are doing. So whims are merely a nominal patterns of activation with near unintended consequences. Herein lies the profound vagueness and inadequacy of your view Matt. What we want to know is what makes us intentionally directed agents but all you and other neuroaficionados can offer us is "activation patterns". You might as well be offering clusters of atomic excitation or ghosts in the glia for that matter.<br /><br />But perhaps your dismissiveness is really just a grudging acknowledgement that the Scientific Image cannot provide the answers that we need in this instance, because it cannot touch what it means to be a embodied embrained creature possessed of skills and skilfully exploitable fallibilities. <br /><br />"I'm saying that "intention" has nothing to do with the science of anatomy and physiology..."<br /><br />I submit that intention has nothing to do with neuroscience either, at least not in the way that you tend to paint its picture. <br /><br />The Scientific Image is a human construct after all for the consumption and use of human beings and as such it is an inextricable part of the Manifest Image no matter how objective it turns out to be. Only together do the two images bring things into stereoscopic relief in the way that Sellers intended the metaphor. You seem to have overlooked this and instead to have adopted the hubris of proud scientism as a monocular perspective in which the only things that come into relief are ever more finely divided patterns of activation.Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-65749044012598938132015-06-01T20:46:35.528+01:002015-06-01T20:46:35.528+01:00Jim you can use action. Even in physiology there a...Jim you can use action. Even in physiology there are many single words that are used in a variety of ways. Action can mean a dynamic, it can refer to a molecular mechanism, it can refer to higher behaviour, and so on and so forth. Your idea of an action directed by an intention can still be called action if you like. Or it can be called volition. Or anything else.Gottlobhttp://www.someonewhocallshimselfgottlobfrege.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-28138655785347286342015-06-01T20:44:54.588+01:002015-06-01T20:44:54.588+01:00And animals that don't reason symbolically und...And animals that don't reason symbolically understand quantities and basic logic and stuff. Humans have some symbolic prostheses which makes us better at abstracting away towards higher mathematics but the basic underlying cognitive system is not linguistic. It's actually more spatial.Matthttp://www.facebookgroupadmin.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-36530624810435768782015-06-01T20:43:37.030+01:002015-06-01T20:43:37.030+01:00"I'm also perplexed as to why you say tha..."I'm also perplexed as to why you say that there is no black and white distinction between actions and autonomic behaviours."<br /><br />It's about degree of regional activation, assuming that we're talking about the relevant branches of neuroscience. Otherwise feel free to carve out whatever manifest image distinctions you like, because we aren't doing science when we're picking up the milk while stressing about whether or not we'll make it to that stupid dinner thing on time.<br /><br />"Are you saying that the mortifying erection of the male rape victim is partially intentional?"<br /><br />No, I'm saying that "intention" has nothing to do with the science of anatomy and physiology, just as neurohormone concentrations have nothing to do with determining whether shoplifting occurred. It's like asking how to calculate the evolution of the wave function of a verb.Matthttp://www.facebookgroupadmin.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-36349198329767593872015-05-31T22:49:01.930+01:002015-05-31T22:49:01.930+01:00I know. You're not wrong either. I'm just ...I know. You're not wrong either. I'm just suggesting that we can distinguish between two radically different forms of behaviour by reference to actions and responses or agency and autonomic processes. You may have noticed that I have quite often used the word "intentional" in conjunction with "action" even though I view this as a tautology. I know where you are coming from though. Do you have any suggestions of alternative terms then to help illuminate the difference or would you always use the conjunction of "intentional action" to distinguish this from the behaviour of chemical reactions and autonomic processes?Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-18112456956483761062015-05-31T22:48:50.817+01:002015-05-31T22:48:50.817+01:00I'm just talking about cells and tissues, not ...I'm just talking about cells and tissues, not higher mental functions.<br /><br />Your use of the word act is not incorrect I am just talking of a particular usage of the word in physiology.Gottlobhttp://www.someonewhocallshimselfgottlobfrege.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-50875327388727291092015-05-31T22:48:04.950+01:002015-05-31T22:48:04.950+01:00Gottlob, So you think there is no distinction nece...Gottlob, So you think there is no distinction necessary between what we are accountable for and what we are not?Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-43571267229170704492015-05-31T22:47:45.700+01:002015-05-31T22:47:45.700+01:00 In physiology an act is a portion of the dynamics... In physiology an act is a portion of the dynamics of the system that has a particular end point in place. In labour, the contraction of the uterine smooth muscles is an act because it is geared towards the deliverance of the baby. Or swallowing is an act because it is directed towards propelling the food down the gullet. Urination is an act to expel urine, moving your thumb is an act say of opposition, or vomiting is a reverse peristaltic act that expels gastric contents. Muscular contraction is an act to oppose to ends of the bone, or neuronal firing is an act to propagate an action potential down a nerve fiber. This is how it is used.<br /><br />Walking on a line is an act of coordination, coordinated by the cerebellum. Aerobic respiration is the cellular activity which converts glucose to water, CO2 and energy using oxygen, or in cancerous cells there is increased mitotic activity.<br /><br />The seeding of malignant cells in a distant site from that of a primary tumour is an act which results in a metastatic deposit.Gottlobhttp://www.someonewhocallshimselfgottlobfrege.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-61107937828673728762015-05-31T22:46:49.961+01:002015-05-31T22:46:49.961+01:00 Gottlob, yes, if they improve through practice th... Gottlob, yes, if they improve through practice then they deserve to be called acts.Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-37391462840647700432015-05-31T22:46:29.484+01:002015-05-31T22:46:29.484+01:00Anderson,
RE: 1) I could t agree more.
RE: 2) He&#...Anderson,<br />RE: 1) I could t agree more.<br />RE: 2) He'd be doing you a favour.<br />RE: 3) indeed.Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-69002988069566656362015-05-31T22:46:08.216+01:002015-05-31T22:46:08.216+01:00Its not a skill, its an act ;-)Its not a skill, its an act ;-)Gottlobhttp://www.someonewhocallshimselfgottlobfrege.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-64333209289047491462015-05-31T22:45:31.816+01:002015-05-31T22:45:31.816+01:00Yes, isn't it incredible the skills we learn? ...Yes, isn't it incredible the skills we learn? And just imagine how few would emerge or develop if we were not social creatures embedded in a culture of accumulated knowhow.Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-73498078905780605482015-05-31T22:45:15.207+01:002015-05-31T22:45:15.207+01:00Jim, the diaphragm, which is the main respiratory ...Jim, the diaphragm, which is the main respiratory muscle, is a skeletal muscle that is both under voluntary and involuntary control. Also coughing and blinking can be both voluntary and involuntary. (Skeletal muscle is a voluntary muscle).<br />Swallowing is a mixture on voluntary and involuntary<br />Same as defecating or urinating.<br />Even walking is involuntary to a degree, like a pendulum.Gottlobhttp://www.someonewhocallshimselfgottlobfrege.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-72250982920881193632015-05-31T22:44:10.336+01:002015-05-31T22:44:10.336+01:00I'm a simple soul and I stick close to metaphy...I'm a simple soul and I stick close to metaphysics. I don't do angels and demons and I don't do ghosts and goblins and I don't do semantic properties and the Platonic entities that would have to exist to have them. But I'll venture three more comments before I go back to posting pictures of the flowers in my yard: 1) a formal rule-governed symbol-manipulating device, per se, doesn't know that anything it's doing involves meaningful symbols at all (because it doesn't know anything at all). Computers are like that: humans attach "meaning" to the "symbols." Computers are more like rocks that way. 2) He'd probably shoo me away, but I'll claim Fodor for a compatriot on this: his idea (LofT and subsequently) was that syntactical structure was not only necessary for generating representations, but syntactical structure could itself constitute a formalization of semantic content. That is, syntax could be a causal bridge between the semantic content of representations and the physical processes that occur in machines/brains. Here is a visualization exercise to help understand the idea: imagine a simple symbol system in which a triangle stands for “yes” and a circle stands for “no.” Now consider those same specific (token) triangles and circles not as symbols but as physical objects with those shapes, and imagine a wheel with triangular cogs that will take triangular objects, but not circular ones, through a barrier. The cogwheel can sort out the “yes’s” from the “no’s” without symbolic interpretation because the shapes also constitute the distinction between them qua symbols. This dual function of geometrical shapes is one simple way that a physical system might function as a symbol processor: shapes can simultaneously have both (conventional) symbolic and (physical) causal roles. 3) If Fodor hadn't already told me to buzz off, he definitely would when I said that I think that Wittgenstein's functional-role semantics, a kind of nominalism about "meaning," is far better (metaphysically speaking, as always) than magical talk about the necessity of symbolic content (I get "magical" from Putnam, Meaning of Meaning, Brain in a Vat etc.).Andersonhttp://www.amancalledbrownintheconversation.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-87518076322827839982015-05-31T22:43:19.908+01:002015-05-31T22:43:19.908+01:00I find it both curious and puzzling Matt, that you...I find it both curious and puzzling Matt, that you regard the efficacy of mathematics — with its necessarily formal procedures — so highly, yet you seem unwilling to recognise that some of the problems of scientific explanation might actually be due to an avoidably informal use of natural language amongst the people who should be using their tools most precisely.<br /><br />I'm also perplexed as to why you say that there is no black and white distinction between actions and autonomic behaviours. Are you saying that the mortifying erection of the male rape victim is partially intentional? Or perhaps a less extreme example would be preferable. Do you suppose that halfhearted actions shade towards autonomic behaviours? Could you provide a good example somewhere towards the middle of the supposed spectrum between the black of response and the white of action (or visa versa)?Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-34121166139177895822015-05-31T22:41:46.891+01:002015-05-31T22:41:46.891+01:00A hiccup is still an action. Same as sneezes and t...A hiccup is still an action. Same as sneezes and tics. It is just an involuntary action.<br /><br />Action doesnt necessarily mean it is voluntary. Like when a uterus contracts to expel a foetus, it is an action.<br /><br />I mean it is mentioned as actions in the medical literature.<br /><br />Action just means to influence something, not the act of influencing something. It is a noun, not a verb.Gottlobhttp://www.someonewhocallshimselfgottlobfrege.com/noreply@blogger.com