tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post5944548670411541326..comments2023-08-19T10:04:08.922+01:00Comments on Thought • Art • Representation: Perception DefinedJim Hamlynhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comBlogger31125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-62229950038481837852014-07-04T21:32:58.950+01:002014-07-04T21:32:58.950+01:00Ok, to make a decision is to make up one's min...Ok, to make a decision is to make up one's mind. Things without minds can't make decisions. Are we settled on this first principle or is there anything else we need to establish at this stage?Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-17167343408026767472014-07-04T21:30:16.087+01:002014-07-04T21:30:16.087+01:00You need to tell people that that's the defini...You need to tell people that that's the definition you're using before you use it.William Shttps://www.balticmill.com/whats-on/exhibitions/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-48006226509795432282014-07-04T21:29:10.608+01:002014-07-04T21:29:10.608+01:00So, you don't think my definition of the word ...So, you don't think my definition of the word decision is "very workable" after all?Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-17456136534335873992014-07-04T21:21:18.241+01:002014-07-04T21:21:18.241+01:00YesYesWilliam Shttps://www.balticmill.com/whats-on/exhibitions/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-74888652864587108652014-07-04T12:27:28.989+01:002014-07-04T12:27:28.989+01:00So, let's get this straight. Are you saying th...So, let's get this straight. Are you saying that my insistence that decisions necessarily involve skills of mind narrows the scope of what we are permitted? I can't disagree that any definition defines limits - that's what definitions are for. They set the parameters for coherent discussion. If you want to retain a wide usage of the word "decision" you will need to accept that the most common equivalent in ordinary language is: "To make up one's mind." Cells don't have minds.Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-24584674601476062822014-07-04T12:20:06.301+01:002014-07-04T12:20:06.301+01:00It's not a distortion; but then I didn't s...It's not a distortion; but then I didn't say that it was. Defending it against the charge that it's a distortion is actually a distortion though (because it implies I said it was). It's more like a codicil really. It narrows the scope of what we're permitted, by the terms of this exchange as you would have them, to call a decision, thus foreclosing any discussion of what is or is not a decision. You want to offer it as a working definition, not just assume that it is. It isn't. It could be, but it isn't now.William Shttps://www.balticmill.com/whats-on/exhibitions/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-14212557908707337822014-07-03T22:57:33.067+01:002014-07-03T22:57:33.067+01:00That's fair criticism but since we are at the ...That's fair criticism but since we are at the stage of clarifying our definitions I think this is inevitable at this stage of theorisation. I don't mean to be dogmatic and I hope that's not how it comes across. Many philosophers are very fond of new coinage and the arguments for this are compelling (ish). Nonetheless we have a lot of workable terms already that, with careful use or slight modification, can do a lot of important work. One of the reasons I admire the Ordinary Language philosophers is because they resisted new coinage because they recognised the power of extant concepts and the need to examine their use very carefully. You're right that I added the part about "advantageous outcome" but I don't think it in any way distorts the concept to say that in any decision we seek an outcome and the efficacy of the decision is dependent to a large degree upon our ability to conceive of what that outcome might be. It wouldn't be a decision otherwise.Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-25252765277486035312014-07-03T22:47:59.152+01:002014-07-03T22:47:59.152+01:00That's a very workable definition of 'deci...That's a very workable definition of 'deciding' for future use in this context – but you can't have thought that that's what everybody already means by it. Obviously they don't – especially not that part about an 'advantageous outcome'. You've added that yourself. The problem throughout is the assumption on your part that your own definitions of words, which are perfectly usable ones, but which are not the dictionary definitions and which are not in general nor in recognised academic/technical circulation, are correct and clear. This is certainly an area in which new coinage is required – the current uses for the word 'intellect' must be in flux, is a good example. But deciding on a definition just on your own and then insisting on it isn't the way ahead, because people aren't going to know what you mean. Especially if you get impatient with them for not already thinking what you've thought on your own. As to your last point – Why can't cells do that? Do you mean single cells can't do that? How many cells then? Or is it something else altogether? (Sorry – bit abrupt! Doing lots of things at the same time.)William Shttps://www.balticmill.com/whats-on/exhibitions/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-56716433592337495232014-07-03T22:33:04.108+01:002014-07-03T22:33:04.108+01:00I was being facetious. But filters don’t make judg...I was being facetious. But filters don’t make judgements, much as we might want to say that what they do has the appearance of judgement. The optic nerves of the human eye do not decide to be unresponsive to UV or infra red (or cheese for that matter). To say that what they do has SOME characteristics of deciding is already to concede that deciding is not precisely what they do. I’m happy to agree that “one neuron fires if the line is horizontal, and another fires if it is vertical.” That is the kind or parsimony that scientists would insist upon, but I’m not happy calling it deciding, and nor I imagine would most scientists. Deciding, as I have already said, requires the comparison of two or more options and the execution of a judgement based on a projection of the most advantageous outcome. Manifestly cells can’t do that.Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-3908204095256427332014-07-03T22:26:31.524+01:002014-07-03T22:26:31.524+01:00Have another look at the post above where I discus...Have another look at the post above where I discuss whether or not it's suitable to speak of deciding. It's not even a little bit like whether or not I 'like' it! Actually, to save you doing that – What I say there is that the process I have also called 'cellular sorting' is, in SOME ways, just like what we would ordinarily call deciding – and then again, in SOME other ways, not. My problem with some of your ideas is that you use, say 'intellect', as if we all knew what it is in this extra- ordinary context. So saying boldly that it is, or is not, a feature of perception makes no sense.William Shttps://www.balticmill.com/whats-on/exhibitions/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-59381629420742583182014-07-03T22:20:05.023+01:002014-07-03T22:20:05.023+01:00"Cellular sorting" - that's fine. Go..."Cellular sorting" - that's fine. Go with that. Drop deciding. You didn't like it in the first place anyway.Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-26993255616674612842014-07-03T22:15:10.953+01:002014-07-03T22:15:10.953+01:00It works with one cell if it's deciding betwee...It works with one cell if it's deciding between being a thing – vertical, or blue for example – and not being that thing. In fact that's how it does work in a lot of cases. Apparently. But my main worry with what you're saying is that I don't think the definitions of these key terms you're using are really coming across. They need to be fuller, because to me it looks as if some things are being dismissed out of hand as types of 'conceptual thinking'. And that was your term to begin with, remember, so it warrants more attention. It seems to be key to what you're saying. Does it, for example. require consciousness? Does it take time to do? Those things would clearly differentiate it from a cellular stimuli sorting process in the retina, which is very very quick and does not, on its own, generally register in consciousness.William Shttps://www.balticmill.com/whats-on/exhibitions/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-66265175329187879542014-07-03T22:08:49.070+01:002014-07-03T22:08:49.070+01:00You pick me up on the sorting block analogy but yo...You pick me up on the sorting block analogy but you miss the fact that in your own elaborated characterisation you needed two (not one) cell to do the deciding.You keep on making the same mistake in my view. You think that we need to map an engine molecule by molecule and causal influence after causal influence as if this will reveal what it is to drive a car. The reason I think Ryle had his head screwed on about this is because he focussed on what we do as a means to understand our concepts of mind. If he had spread the net a little wider rather than focussing entirely on language I suspect that he would be regarded as the person to have finally settled the question of consciousness.Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-36549370629794455202014-07-03T22:00:50.623+01:002014-07-03T22:00:50.623+01:00Back to Ryle – The Concept of Mind is not a book a...Back to Ryle – The Concept of Mind is not a book about brains, it's about minds. And 'Ryle's regress' points out the absurdity of believing that a thought must be preceded by a thought to think that thought, and that preceded by another, and so on. But he has nothing to say about the biological conditions for, or necessary precedents to, a thought. He has nothing to say about neural correlates (actually I don't think that term was around when Ryle wrote his book). There are, demonstrably, necessary biological antecedents to, for example, deciding between two things – and that's true whether it be abstract discernment (is it round or square?) or the expression of preferences (cheese or ham?).William Shttps://www.balticmill.com/whats-on/exhibitions/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-30034934825744793962014-07-03T13:35:02.683+01:002014-07-03T13:35:02.683+01:00I wrote that "I" draw a sharp line betwe...I wrote that "I" draw a sharp line between sensory discrimination and distinguishing. I didn't expect that this would be immediately obvious. I therefore also explained what I think constitutes discrimination ("a disposition to respond differentially to objects or attributes of different sorts") and what I think constitutes distinguishing: "linguistically enabled" concept formation.Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-78226364116339526262014-07-03T13:30:11.587+01:002014-07-03T13:30:11.587+01:00You're urging care and caution about what we c...You're urging care and caution about what we call things here, but 'All distinguishing is conceptual' is not cautious; and I don't think it's really right either. 'All discrimination is sensory' is even less cautious, and I can't think what you think it means even. Also that analogy with your son's sorting of blocks is a bad one – not because the toy is clever, but the toy is on its own. One cell isn't clever. There have to be others with which it has connections.William Shttps://www.balticmill.com/whats-on/exhibitions/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-46862450957073039362014-07-03T11:57:32.373+01:002014-07-03T11:57:32.373+01:00When an infant pushes bricks through a sorting toy...When an infant pushes bricks through a sorting toy the toy doesn’t make a decision which blocks to let through, nonetheless the toy is predisposed to allow bricks of a certain kind through one hole and bricks of another kind through another hole. It's a filter.<br />I think we should avoid ascriptions of decision-execution unless we can provide evidence that this is the case. Decision-making is way up the evolutionary tree. We have more parsimonious terminology and if we don’t use it then we’re in danger of muddying the water with ascriptions of decision-making before we have even got to the more challenging question of how a creature could actually make a decision.Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-49282871219658330132014-07-03T11:48:42.074+01:002014-07-03T11:48:42.074+01:00At the level I'm talking about a 'decision...At the level I'm talking about a 'decision' would be this – one neuron fires if the line is horizontal, and another fires if it is vertical. So, ordinarily defined it is a type of decision, since there are two options, and one or other of those is the outcome. But it's also remote from any ordinary usage because we don't usually talk about neurons – we talk about sandwiches and shoes, and so on. The word makes some sense in this context, but there are problems – Can one, for example, make a decision and not know about it? Does that count? Generally we'd say no, but then allow some unconscious decisions (in therapy we will admit to them, for example). My question really is about your confident distinction between 'sensory' and 'intellectual'. The problems with 'decision' are not the same, but are similar in an important way to those affecting your 'distinguishing' and 'conceptual' and 'sensory' and other words.William Shttps://www.balticmill.com/whats-on/exhibitions/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-20202616468056365432014-07-03T10:06:27.841+01:002014-07-03T10:06:27.841+01:00All distinguishing is conceptual. All discriminati...All distinguishing is conceptual. All discrimination is sensory. Obviously you need to be able to sense something before you do any distinguishing about it but, and this is crucial, you don't need to be able to distinguish between one line and another in most cases to be able to behave intelligently in relation to them but you would need to be capable of discriminating between them by sensory means.<br />The difference between a horizontal fountain pen line and a horizontal ballpoint line would requires distinguishing aided obviously by sensory discrimination.<br />It might help if you could characterise, as simply as you can, what you mean when you say that an optic nerve "decides". I suspect that some pieces will fall into place just by reasoning that through.Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-76396422220588428642014-07-03T09:56:25.509+01:002014-07-03T09:56:25.509+01:00So, is distinguishing between a line that goes up ...So, is distinguishing between a line that goes up and down and one that goes side to side 'conceptual thinking'?William Shttps://www.balticmill.com/whats-on/exhibitions/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-57736809978911477572014-07-03T09:48:06.039+01:002014-07-03T09:48:06.039+01:00A decision takes the comparison of differing optio...A decision takes the comparison of differing options and the execution of a judgement based on a projection of the most advantageous outcome. A disposition to respond is a tendency to do a certain thing in response to a certain stimulus. The difference in energy consumed alone is gigantic.<br />Of course, using language, you can do all kinds of subtle forms of distinguishing that are enabled by culturally acquired concepts which allow us to analyse what we see and make countless judgements.<br />Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-86471241970439785292014-07-03T09:32:22.195+01:002014-07-03T09:32:22.195+01:00Isn't deciding whether a thing is of one sort ...Isn't deciding whether a thing is of one sort or another conceptual thought? Or, to put it another way, does making such a decision have to take long enough to notice you're doing it to count as conceptual thinking?William Shttps://www.balticmill.com/whats-on/exhibitions/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-88358387477932974092014-07-03T09:02:33.384+01:002014-07-03T09:02:33.384+01:00It's sensory discrimination (not deciding). If...It's sensory discrimination (not deciding). If it took conceptual thought to do such a simple thing, life would never have got started.Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-21546066760979087402014-07-02T21:14:07.207+01:002014-07-02T21:14:07.207+01:00So, what's the answer with the line? Which is ...So, what's the answer with the line? Which is it?William Shttps://www.balticmill.com/whats-on/exhibitions/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7206373238418288113.post-40930496489001945852014-07-02T20:59:10.037+01:002014-07-02T20:59:10.037+01:00Yes, sensory discrimination is a disposition to re...Yes, sensory discrimination is a disposition to respond differentially to objects or attributes of different sorts. I draw a sharp line between sensory discrimination and the more sophisticated skill of distinguishing which is linguistically enabled and allows us to do all kinds of additional stuff.Jim Hamlynhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16488331333061422244noreply@blogger.com