A b o u t • T h i s • S i t e

Welcome.

This online journal aims to explore and promote a causal account of mind that makes a break with mainstream analytic philosophy over the role and especially the evolution of representational capacities. I argue that representations (signals, images, mimicry, language etc.) are perceptible items and behaviours that are fully reliant upon necessary and sufficient conditions of evolutionary emergence and utilisation. Moreover, I argue that these necessary and sufficient conditions are impossible within bodily organs (like the brain) because organs are not organisms in need of communicative artefacts or behaviours to mediate their behaviour. Representations are articles of cultural evolution, not biological evolution. If this is correct, then the widespread assumption throughout much cognitive science, philosophy and other related disciplines--that brains produce their own representations--is unfounded.

Since undertaking a research residency in Australia in 2011, my thinking on representation has undergone a significant change. Whilst presenting a conference paper at NIEA in Sydney, I encountered the work of one of the keynote speakers, Donald Brook, whose theories of representation have been published widely over the last 50 years. Despite this international dissemination, Brook’s ideas appear to have had relatively little impact outside the Australian artworld, yet considering their implications, not only for art and philosophy but for culture more generally and science also, this is somewhat strange – though it is by no means inexplicable.

Of course, it may be the case that Brook is mistaken and the lukewarm reception of his work is indicative of underlying conceptual weaknesses. However, if these weaknesses are obvious, it should be possible to find at least one or two persuasive counter-arguments mounted over the last half century in some of the many journals etc. in which his work has been published. Despite extensive investigation, I can find no such objections – nothing other than simple misunderstanding or the occasional petulant remonstration.

The explanatory challenges presented by perception and consciousness are well known in philosophy and many contrasting theories have been developed to explain and overcome them. It cannot be the case that all the available theories are correct. It is far more likely that most – if not all – are flawed in one or more ways. However, if everyone is making the same foundational error, as the work of Hacker and Bennett, Hutto and Myin or Ramsey suggests, then perhaps a principled alternative is required.

I argue that Brook's account of representation resolves – or at the very least forms the basis for resolving – many perplexities that have stymied thinkers for millennia and provides powerful tools for exploring many related issues and theoretical obstacles. This blog is an attempt to chart the many insights that come from taking Brook's work seriously whilst also providing reasoned arguments and evidence in support of these theories.

If you would like to discuss the ideas presented on this site or to share your own research then Please feel free to add a response to one of the comments boxes provided or alternatively send me an email here.