This article is the last in a group of four on the subject of appearances and is intended to provide further support for the claim that when we speak of appearances - of one thing
‘looking-like’ something else - we are in fact speaking of how we could
represent the thing in question through the use of one or other form of visual representation - most commonly what Donald Brook would define as a “Simulating
Representation.”
Several
months ago my two year old son went through a phase of exclaiming “Same!”
whenever he saw two identical things; toy figures and character cards
especially. One thing I could never get him to do though was say “same” when
presented with an object and its representation. Two pictures could be the same
and two action figures could be the same but an action figure could never be
the same as a picture of the action figure. Obviously a single test-subject is poor
proof of principle but it seems highly likely that this would be the case for
all children at the same stage of early language development. Pictures are not
the same as objects, that’s pretty obvious, but what is far from obvious is
quite what distinguishes representations from the things they represent but the difference is far from simply a question of physical dimension.
Donald Brook
defines three fundamental forms of representation. Only two of these are really
needed here, so for the sake of brevity I’ll simplify (anyone wishing to find
out more can read here). The first form of representation is what Brook terms
“Matching”. Matching representations rely on the fact that we are unable to
discriminate between certain things, or properties of things, because they are
genuinely alike in certain respects. A prime example would be a circular paint
chip halved. In a whole variety of ways these two halves would be
indisciminable from one another: colour, thickness, shape, reflectance etc.
Even if we were to examine them through the use of modern technologies we would
probably find more ways in which they match than ways in which they differ. In
this sense we can say, with a high degree of certainty - although we may be mistaken - that the respects in
which they match are objective such that any other species of perceivers would
also find it equally impossible to sensorily discriminate between them in these
same respects.
It might be objected that the two chips are not
representations of each other. It is certainly true that there is nothing
intrinsically representational about either of the chips, yet it just so
happens that we can use one to refer to the other: I can substitute one for the
other, for example by holding one up and asking: “Have you got the another one
of these?” In such a situation I would be using one chip to draw your attention
to the other chip by dint of their matching characteristics. Equally, I could focus
on just one matching characteristic by holding out three 1p coins for instance and
saying: “Do you have this many 2p coins?” If you were in possession of sufficient
coins, you could match my 3 with your 3 in respect
of quantity and coinage. The coins might be different in all manner of other
respects but in respect of quantity and coinage (which were the required
attributes of the request) they would match perfectly. The primary point to
bear in mind here is that we are able to substitute thing A for thing B if they
are genuinely the same in one or more appreciable respects.
Another
paradigm case of a matching representation is provided by two identical copies
of the same photograph. Just as with the game “Snap” we are able to use one
image as a match of the other in a whole variety of respects. However - and
this is where we move on to another vital form of representation defined by
Brook as “Simulating Representation” - the two images are not just potential matching representations of one another, they are also simulating
representations of whatever was registered upon the once light-sensitive
emulsion coating their surfaces.
Simulating
representations are appreciably different than matching representations and are
dependent upon systematic limitations of our perceptual makeup that, in certain
circumstances and in certain respects, leave us unable to discriminate between
things that we know with absolute certainty are different. With one eye closed I
can hold up a pencil in such a way that it is indiscriminable in height from a
distant telegraph pole. I know that it is not the same height but when it is
held in careful alignment I cannot perceive a difference in their respective
heights. Similarly I can mix a quantity of paint that simulates the colour of
distant mountains viewed through hazy atmosphere. The colour will not match, yet
in certain circumstances (prevailing illumination especially) we would find it
very difficult to discriminate between the colour of the mixed paint and colour
of the distant hill viewed through haze.
Cinematography,
photography, representational painting, and representational drawing are
predominantly simulating representational media, although they often also incorporate
various aspects of matching: a mug shot might match its subject in terms of
facial symmetry, proportional relationships of features, quantity of eyes, nose
and mouth etc. The point to bear in mind about simulating representations is
that they are an incredibly sophisticated form of representation that has been
gradually developed over many centuries and particularly since the discovery of
perspective, photography and the moving image to become an indispensible part
of the modern world. Despite the fact that we find it immensely difficult to
discriminate between simulating representations and the things they represent
in certain respects and in certain circumstances we know categorically that
simulating representations are simulating representations. Nobody, unless placed
under very specific perceptual constraints, has ever mistaken a simulating
representation for reality.
When
we speak of the appearance of
something, there are broadly two respects in which we might use the word.
Firstly we might wish to draw attention to the objective properties of an object.
We might say of a red ball that “It has a scarlet appearance”. We might even
say that “The red ball appears red”. Notice though that the use of the word "appearance" is
somewhat redundant in this second example. If the ball is red then we would be
more likely to say: “The ball is red.”
The
second and much more common use of the word “appearance” is the use I have been
exploring in these last few posts (and their associated and sometimes lengthy comments). In this sense
appearances are analogous to simulating representations: we know that appearances
are not objective properties of objects but we find ourselves almost
instinctively compelled to describe the appearance as "looking-like" something
else; as being plausibly substituted by a representation of this appearance.
The reason we are compelled to do this is because we have become so adept as a species at making, selecting accepting and offering visual
representations of the things that we perceive that this prodigious
ability has become second nature; we are almost completely unaware of it.
The
final challenge that I would lay before any philosopher on this subject then is
this: out of every conceivable appearance of this latter kind (the kind that we
know not to be an objective property of things seen) there is not one, not a
single one, for which you, or anyone else for that matter, could produce a
matching representation. Why? Because appearances are strategies for producing simulating
representations: the type of representation that exploits systematic limitations in our sensory capabilities.
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